Bryant University

Bryant Digital Repository
History and Social Sciences Faculty Journal
Articles

History and Social Sciences Faculty
Publications and Research

2005

The Global Enforcement of Human Rights: the Unintended
Consequences of Transnational Litigation
Andrea Boggio
Bryant University, aboggio@bryant.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bryant.edu/histss_jou
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Law and Society
Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Boggio, Andrea, "The Global Enforcement of Human Rights: the Unintended Consequences of
Transnational Litigation" (2005). History and Social Sciences Faculty Journal Articles. Paper 89.
https://digitalcommons.bryant.edu/histss_jou/89
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History and Social Sciences Faculty Publications and
Research at Bryant Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in History and Social Sciences Faculty
Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Bryant Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
dcommons@bryant.edu.

Int’l J. of Human Rights, 2005, Vol. 10 (4), pp. 000-00
© 2005 Routledge

THE GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION
ANDREA BOGGIO*

ABSTRACT
In the last few years, a growing number of individuals whose basic rights are violated have filed
transnational human rights claims in foreign countries. By placing the individual as a holder of
basic rights at the core of the process of development, the capability approach, as put forward by
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, provides a fertile theoretical framework to assess
translational human rights litigation.
The paper shows that transnational claims are problematic in two regards: 1) They undermine
development by discouraging foreign companies from investing in countries that are sources of
transnational claims and by weakening local governments and judiciaries; 2) The conflict
resolution process is inadequate because financial and practical constraints prevent stakeholders
from directly participating in the process, and because assessing damages and enforcing award
judgments will likely be unfair. The path to be taken involves developing a stronger rule of law,
stronger local institutions and independent judiciaries in those developed countries where the
violations of basic human rights take place.
Key words: Capability approach – human rights violations – transnational litigation –
multinationals – offshoring – Alien Tort Claims Act

I. INTRODUCTION
Violations of human rights raise both ethical and legal challenges. The capability
approach – as put forward by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum – persuasively
advocates that human rights are an essential to development and that their violation is
morally wrong and jeopardises the development process. Primarily dealing with issues of
quality of life, gender inequality, welfare economics, well-being and human
development, the capability approach provides a conceptual framework to analyze
transnational human rights litigation. 1 Transnational human rights litigation is a dispute
resolution process exercise of jurisdictional power of courts in Country A to solve claims
brought by one or more citizens of Country B for violations of human rights that took
*
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place in Country B. Transnational claims thus aim to geographical fill the gap between
the place where the human rights violation took place and the place where the legal
claims are adjudicated. However, whether this dispute resolution process is the best
arrangement to solve those disputes and fill the geographical gap is a controversial policy
issue.
In this paper, I argue that, although a valuable tool to redress human rights
violations, overtime transnational litigation may have a negative impact on the same
individuals and societies that benefit from today’s transnational lawsuits. Among the
unintended consequences, transnational litigation may in fact undermine the development
of LDC by rendering those countries less competitive from a legal standpoint and by
weakening local governments and judiciaries. I then show that capability approach
provides a valuable ethical framework to reason about the policy issues arising out of
transnational human right litigation. I then conclude that the capability approach suggests
that favouring local adjudication through capacity building instruments is a superior
dispute resolution process to transnational human right litigation.
II. THE CAPABILITY APPROACH AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
The capability approach places the individual as a holder of basic rights at the
core of the process of development. Thus, rather than seeing the individual aspects of the
civil and political human freedoms as opposed to the collective aspects of the social and
economic human rights, the two are approached as an integrated and mutually
interdependent whole. The basic idea is that ‘[d]evelopment can be seen . . . as a process
of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy,’ 2 or, in Sen’s jargon, people’s
capabilities. The capabilities are defined as ‘what people are actually able to do and to
be,’ 3 or the opportunities to undertake actions and activities that the capabilities’ holders
want to engage in and be whom they want to be. This broad approach emphasises the
relevance of the whole array of human capabilities in development processes, which list
comprises social, cultural and economic capabilities such as the right to health, the right
to food and the right to livelihood. The capabilities are thus conceptually distinct from the
‘achieved functionings,’ i.e. to transform the capabilities in actions and conditions of the
real such as working, resting, being literate, being healthy, being part of a community,
being respected. Under the capability approach what is ultimately important is that people
have the freedom to choose what they want to do and be, and that social institutions
should put them in the position to enjoy those freedoms or capabilities and to be free to
choose individually which capabilities ought to be transformed in functionings. 4
The capability approach thus provides a fertile framework for policy analysis.
Public policies, market mechanisms and social institutions are evaluated to be good and
just insofar as they expand people’s capabilities consisting of their opportunities and
choices to lead valuable human lives. In other words, social arrangements should ideally
aim at expanding the people’s capabilities at the greatest extent possible. Policies should
thus aim at putting the capabilities’ holders in the position of freely making choices.
Limitations to their freedoms are suspect. Consequently, people should have right to their
individual capabilities.
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Scholars of the capability approach have discussed at length the relationship
between the human capabilities and human rights. 5 Although Sen and Nussbaum are in
disagreement on whether certain basic capabilities are morally required, both
philosophers agree that a certain degree of capabilities – a threshold degree – should be
afforded to all human beings to put them in the condition of living a decent human life. In
Sen’s language, such amount of capabilities is called ‘basic capability’ and ‘[it] is
intended to separate out the ability to satisfy certain crucially important functionings up
to certain minimally adequate levels.’ 6 On the other hand, Nussbaum argues that people
are entitled to central human capabilities, which are formally enumerated in form of list,7
which should serve as ‘a foundation for basic political principles that should underwrite
constitutional guarantees.’ 8 Thus every society should strive to guarantee to its members
a set of entitlements including capabilities such as living a long life and avoiding
premature death, having good health and adequate nourishment, freedom of movement,
freedom from assault, freedom of choice regarding sexual matters, to use one’s senses,
imaginations thinking and practical reason, and to engage in various forms of social and
political relationships. 9 Although the differences between the major thinkers behind the
capability approach are not trivial, 10 for the purpose of this paper, both scholars advocate
the legal recognition of basic human entitlements or capabilities, whose infringements
would be considered a violation of a basic human right.
III. THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ADJUDICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS
Everyday, many individuals are unfortunately denied their basic human rights.
The Human Development Report 2000 notes that, ‘ Of all human rights failures today,
those in economic and social areas affect by far the larger number and are the most
widespread across the world's nations and large numbers of people.’ 11 Classic Western
legal theorists think that the legal systems should provide the environment where social
and economic human rights grow as integral part of development by empowering the
capabilities’ holders of a right to claim to legal redress for the violations of their basic
human freedoms and rights.12 In other words, legal systems shall provide both remedies
and a process to redress the violations of human rights. In fact, exercising the right to
claim legal redress gives rise to a dispute resolution process that aims at filling the gap
between the claim and the remedies available under the law.
In the last few years, individuals of countries that do not afford these such basic
human rights – in most cases less developed countries (LDCs) – have increasingly sought
legal redress by filing transnational human rights claims. Because of a weak rule of law
and the lack the domestic legal institutions that can provide reasonable redress to those
claims, claimants seek justice in foreign jurisdictions where such preconditions exist.
Thus, British judges have adjudicated claims brought by South-African asbestos miners
because of their asbestos-related injuries and U.S. judges have adjudicated claims brought
by groups of Burmese, Latin and Central American workers for the violations of their
basic rights while working in their countries for U.S. and European companies.
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Transnational litigation often provides the only avenue to provide legal redress –
in the form of economic and non-economic compensation – to the victims of human
rights violations in LDCs and to stop the violators from infringing upon individuals’
rights. The growing substitution of foreign labour for domestic labour, i.e., offshoring –
especially in those countries were hourly wage are significantly lower that in Western
societies – suggests that transnational litigation will be pursued more often. As on
corporate consultants put it, ‘the economics of offshoring are just too compelling to
ignore if does right.’13 McKinsey cites two examples to support the claim. ‘BMW’s plant
in South Africa employs the same line of attack. Operating in these countries often
requires extra training for workers—BMW spends three to five times more on training in
South Africa than it does in its other plants—but wage differences more than offset that
cost.’ Moreover, ‘a leading U.S. personal-computer manufacturer created telephone- and
e-mail-based customer service centres in India to provide technical support. In addition to
saving more than $100m annually, it has significantly increased the proportion of
customer problems it resolves.’14 This prediction might be particularly accurate because
countries offering lower hourly wages area often not on the forefront of acknowledging
and enforcing human rights violations. In the next section, I discuss some of the
transnational cases that have been already brought in the United States and in the United
Kingdom.
IV. TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
Although numerous kinds of claims fall under the notion of transnational human
rights litigation, I focus my analysis on human rights violations substantiating in personal
injuries arising out of employment conditions.15 Foreign citizens have been able to bring
personal injury actions against foreign companies before courts in the United States and
in the United Kingdom for negligent actions an omissions committed in the country
where the plaintiffs reside seeking compensation of the infringements of their basic
rights. Tort laws and specific statutes both in the United States and in the United
Kingdom provide the basis for filing transnational claims. U.S. federal courts may in fact
hear ‘any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the Unites States.’ 16 Similarly, British common law allows
foreigners to file their claims in British courts unless the defendant can show that the
foreign forum is more suitable ‘for the interests of all the parties and the ends of
justice.’ 17 Involving the combined application of national laws, foreign laws, and
principles and rules of public international law, the adjudication is always carried out by
foreign judicial systems and judges appointed by foreign governments who apply the
procedural law of the location of the trial. The next two sections will discuss examples of
transnational lawsuits brought in the two cited jurisdictions.
A. THE UNITED STATES : LITIGATION UNDER THE ALIEN TORT C LAIMS ACT
(ATCA)

The Alien Tort Claims Act allows foreign plaintiff to file tort claims in US
Federal Courts. ‘The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
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an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
Unites States.’ 18 Thus, ATCA grants U.S. courts jurisdiction over foreign defendants in
tort actions where plaintiffs assert a tort claim that violates a U.S. treaty or the ‘law of
nations.’ 19
Beginning with Filartiga, 20 the long-dormant ATCA increasingly presented the
prospect of enforcing international human rights violations through the U.S. federal
courts. In Filartiga, a torture claim was brought against a former official of the
government of Paraguay. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal held that an alien could sue
in U.S. federal court for a ‘tort’ that violates the ‘law of nations.’ 21 The court found that
torture violated the law of nations,22 and avoided the necessity of ruling on whether a
private party could be liable since the defendant had been a state actor when the
violations occurred. 23
Since Filartiga, courts ‘have also recognised that the statute applies to
commanders as well as to the actual torturer, to organizations and corporations as well as
to individuals, and to private personas well as to government actors.’ Thus taking
advantage of the modern doctrine of ATCA that born out of atrocious human rights
abuses, several foreign plaintiffs sought to redress human rights violations that had taken
place in the workplace. The first of these new ATCA lawsuits was filed in September
1996 by a group of Burmese against a U.S. company, Unocal. 24 Plaintiffs alleged that
Unocal was liable for international human rights violations perpetrated by the Burmese
military by knowingly using forced labour to construct a natural gas pipeline across the
Tenasserin region of Burma, which was created to natural gas from oil fields off the coast
of Burma to the Thai border. Although plaintiffs’ claims had been initially dismissed on
summary judgment by District Court, in September 2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals rendered a landmark decision against Unocal, allowing plaintiffs to proceed to
trial in federal court.
While the allegations against Unocal for using slave labour in Burma are litigated,
a series of cases have been brought under the ATCA and the Torture Victim Protection
Act (TVPA) 25 alleging that some of the largest American corporations have knowingly
participated in human rights violations while operating business in foreign countries. The
case law was in fact allowing claims against private corporations when it had engaged ‘in
one of the core international law violations that do not require state action, such as
genocide or slavery, or when it acts in complicity with a state actor committing any of the
core violations.’ 26 Thus, Exxon Mobil was named defendant by a group of Indonesian
citizens for allegedly committing violations of human rights by recruiting one or more
military units to provide security for its gas extraction and liquefaction project.27
Plaintiffs’ theory of liability is that Exxon is liable either because the defendant either
employed members of the military units or based on the liability theories of respondeat
superior or vicarious liability. Moreover, Coca-Cola was named defendant in a lawsuit
filed by five Colombian nationals and a Colombian labour union for tortuous acts
allegedly consisting in using paramilitaries to engage anti-union violence. 28 Fresh Del
Monte Produce was named defendant in a lawsuit filed by five former union leaders who
were allegedly tortured and detained in Guatemala.29 Finally, DynCorp was named
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defendant in a lawsuit filed by the International Labor Rights Fund on behalf of more
than 10,000 Ecuadorian citizens who are ‘suffering health effects as a result of the
company’s spraying of a toxic herbicide on their communities as part of a larger
operation to eradicate coca plants in Columbia.’ 30
All these cases allege blatant violations of human rights that raise important legal
issues of whether U.S. courts have jurisdiction over all the claims, whether the defendants
owed a duty of care to the foreign victims of human rights violations and, finally, whether
the American corporate parent should be held liable for the actions of the foreign
subsidiary. All these issues have been major procedural barriers to foreign plaintiffs:
‘Most of the post-Filártiga cases have been dismissed, most often for failure to allege a
violation of international recognised human rights, for forum non conveniens, or because
of the immunity of the defendant.’ 31
Courts are in the process of addressing them as they are presented in courts.
Although predicting the future of ATCA litigation is difficult, both advocates for and
against ATCA litigation 32 share the common view that U.S. courts are increasingly
favourable to transnational claims and that it is reasonable to assume that, in the next five
years, ATCA cases will be increasingly filed and U.S. courts asked to adjudicate them.
Given the sympathetic support of U.S. courts, it is also foreseeable that plaintiffs will
overcome today’s procedural barriers, and that judges and juries will be eventually asked
to define the scope of the actionable violations and the standard of liability.
Today the scope of ACTA litigation has been certainly limited to certain major
human rights violations. Courts have held that ATCA provides a cause of action as
‘plaintiffs . . . allege a violation of ‘specific, universal, and obligatory’ international
norms as part of [their] ATCA claim.’ 33 Defining the substance of the ‘law of nations’ is
a however complex tasks that U.S. courts still have to perfect. In Filartiga, the Second
Circuit held that ‘[t]he law of nations ‘may be ascertained by consulting the works of
jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations;
or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.’’ 34 The law of nations may be
defined as,
[A] system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and established by
universal consent among the civilised inhabitants of the world . . . to
insure the observance of justice and good faith, in that intercourse which
must frequently occur between two or more independent states, and the
individuals belonging to each. 35

Judge Edwards of the D.C. Circuit pointed out that deriving concrete standard of
liability from ‘amorphous’ international law norms places ‘an awesome duty on federal
courts.’ 36 If there is some agreement that torture, murder, slavery, rape and genocide are
within the notion of ‘law of nations,’ international consensus is lacking on many issues
crucial to human rights concerns such as a living wage, minimum health and safety
standards, maximum hours, and sexual harassment. 37 However, ‘[ATCA] presents the
potential to address claims involving intentional physical or mental harm, but is not likely
to reach less extreme but much more common claims, including abominable working
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conditions.’ 38 In other words, the scope of the notion of ‘law of nations’ is evolving and
expanding overtime, eventually providing a transnational tool to the redress of a wide
range of human rights violations.
When cases will reach a stage where courts or juries will be required to make a
determination of liability, the central question will be to define under which standards of
liability under which the defendants should be tried. It is very likely that the law of the
forum – U.S. law in ATCA cases – will become the law to be applied to the facts of the
case. Most of ATCA cases are, in fact, tort cases, thus requiring a determination of
whether or not the defendant knowingly or negligently breached the duty of care owed to
foreign victims of human rights violations. Although, under the majority rule, ‘ATCA not
only confers jurisdiction but also creates a cause of action,’ 39 U.S. federal judges will be
very likely to find those standards in domestic law, especially of the plaintiff’s legal
system provide very limited protection to the victims. They will do either in bench trials
or in instructing juries, or in deciding over an appeal as in the Unocal case.
indeed, the published ATCA opinions support my claim that the process I
describe is taking place. Thus, the Ninth Circuit defined ‘forced labour’ – which the
judges considered to be a violation of the ‘law of nations’ – by making reference only to
U.S. case law and to the U.S. Constitution, without even trying to capture a more
widespread, supranational notion of ‘forced labour.’ 40 Furthermore, if juries will be asked
to make a determination of liability, jurors will likely decide by using their natural
mindset, the perspective of the average American juror. Furthermore, the actors of the
litigation process are invariably lawyers and judges trained in domestic law, admitted in
the domestic jurisdiction, and daily practicing domestic law. Thus, they will likely litigate
the case as if they were ordinary civil actions. Finally, defendants’ actions will be found
‘reasonable’ if complying with American standards. In sum, if U.S. courts will ever deal
with the substance of ATCA claims, in the absence of clear agreement of international
lawyers and scholars, American corporation will likely to be held liable as if they were
conduction business in the United States or any other developed country.
B. THE UNITED KINGDOM: THE SOUTH-AFRICAN ASBESTOS LITIGATION (LUBBE V.
CAPE)41

English common law allows transnational human right claims. ‘Traditionally
English courts did little to discourage litigants form choosing to litigate in England, when
the case was brought there consistent with English jurisdictional rules.’42 In 1972, Lord
Denning stated that,
No one who comes to these courts asking for justice should come in vain.
To rights to come here is not confined to Englishmen. It extends to any
friendly foreigner.43

Although this liberal view has partially eroded over the past two decades, foreign
claimants are denied access to British courts only if the defendant can show that the
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foreign forum is more suitable ‘for the interests of all the parties and the ends of
justice.’ 44 Such limitation is known as the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
This jurisdictional barrier did not dissuade a group of asbestos victims from filing
personal injury lawsuits in the English High Court. Thus, in February 1997, five miners
from Prieska and Penge filed claims to recover damages in court for personal injuries
caused by the exposure to asbestos fibres in the course of their employment. ‘The claims
were based principally on the negligent control of the company’s world-wide asbestos
business from England and failure to take measures to reduce asbestos exposures to a safe
level.’45 The complaint alleged that the defendant as a parent company had failed to
discharge its duty to ensure the compliance with proper health and safety standards by its
overseas subsidiaries.
The defendant, Cape Ltd., had directly owned some of its South African operation
for many years. By 1948, the company had restructured, so that its mining and
manufacturing operations were owned by South African subsidiaries. In 1979, Cape sold
its South African asbestos mining subsidiary, and, in 1989, its remaining interests in the
manufacturing subsidiaries. 46
Two Court of Appeal and two House of Lords decisions were necessary to
dismiss the defendant’s argument that British courts were a forum non conveniens, and to
establish the right of South African miners to have their cases heard. 47 On appeal before
the House of Lords, the plaintiffs eventually succeeded in establishing the English courts’
jurisdiction over the claims. The House of Lord ruled unanimously that, although South
African courts were clearly the more appropriate forum for the trial, substantial justice
would not have been served if the claims were litigated in South Africa. Under the
governing law, claims should be dismissed on forum non conveniens arguments if a twoprong test is satisfied: (1) only the foreign forum is more appropriate, and (2) justice is
likely to be served in the appropriate forum. The highest British court concluded that
South African courts were not the most appropriate forum because there was no evidence
that legal aid would have been available to the miners. Lord Bingham noted that,
If these proceedings were stayed in favour of the more appropriate forum
in South Africa the probability is that the plaintiffs would have no means
of obtaining the professional representation and the expert evidence that
would be essential if these claims were to be justly decided. This would
amount to a denial of justice. 48

Furthermore, there was evidence that suggested that, under the circumstances of
the case, legal representation would be likely not available if the claims were to be
litigated in South Africa. Second, South African law did not provide specifically for
group actions, thus raising suspicions about the ability of South African claims to provide
an adequate and fair setting for the trial. 49
Although plaintiffs successfully established their right to have their claims heard
by U.K. judges, the over 7,500 claims were never litigated, nor in England neither in
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South Africa. The parties eventually settled the case in December 2001 after long
negotiation. 50 Under the settlement agreement,
[The defendant] has agreed to pay a total of £21 million into a Trust fund
to be established in South Africa which will make payments to those who
may show that they have suffered from asbestos-related disease . . . as a
result of working at, or living in the vicinity of, one of Cape’s former
mining, milling, or manufacturing operations in South Africa. 51

Under the agreement, compensation is available not only to the claimants who
took part in the English litigation, but also to all victims who satisfy the conditions set by
the trust. The level of compensation is linked to the severity of the disease:
‘[M]esothelioma awards being the highest (about £5,250 total maximum); asbestosis
(about £3,250 total max); pleural thickening/pleural effusion (about £1,600 total max),
pleural plaques (about £700 total max).’52
Although the litigation and the negotiation were successful, enforcing the
settlement has proven to be a complex task. Under the agreement, the £21m will not be
paid in one lump sum, but the defendant was supposed to make available the first £11m
in June 2002 only if various conditions are satisfied, the most important being the South
African Government’s commitment of not funding future legal claims against Cape and
of not pursuing Cape ‘for any cost of rehabilitating its former asbestos mines.’53 Under
threat of bankruptcy, Cape failed to pay the settlement for several months. However, in
June 2003, the High Court eventually approved the compensation settlement at the end of
the hearing. Cape handed over bankers’ drafts for £7.5m, which victims to receive
payments during summer 2003. 54
V. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LITIGATION
In the remains of the paper, I shall investigate under the lenses of the capability
approach the policy question of whether transnational litigation is better suited to redress
human rights violations. The central idea of the capability approach is that
‘[d]evelopment can be seen . . . as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people
enjoy.’ 55 In other words, there is no development without freedom. My analysis will be
thus proceeds from the point of view of the capabilities’ holders who are entitled to basic
freedoms that human rights violations infringe. Those individuals are nonetheless the
citizens of those LCDs where the violations took place. Transnational human rights cases
are litigated in their interest – they are the stakeholders with the greatest interest in
dispute resolution process – and the expansion of their freedoms creates development for
them and their countries. Thus, the capability approach places the holders of basic
freedoms and rights at the centre of the policy analysis, and consequently of my analysis
of human rights transnational litigation as dispute resolution process.
From the point of view of capabilities’ holders, this litigation has the undeniable
merit of providing judicial redress to violations that, without the involvement of foreign
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judicial systems, would be unheard in courts. In fact, the victims would not have access
to justice in their home countries, and would receive no compensation. Moreover, the
perpetrators of the violations would not be held accountable. In today’s ineffectiveness of
many judicial systems around the world, stopping transnational claims would impair the
ability of the capabilities’ holders to seek legal redress and of many countries to move
toward development. However, the policy analysis of transnational claims should take
into account a long-term perspective. The inquiry should thus focus on whether
transnational litigation is the dispute resolution process that better protects the interests of
the holders in the long run.
The next section will thus critically assess, from a policy perspective, the ability
of transnational human rights litigation to serve the interests of the holders. I will argue
that transnational human rights litigation affects development in at least in two regards.
First, it discourages foreign companies from investing in countries that are sources of
transnational claims. Second, it weakens local governments and judiciary. Each argument
will be examined separately.
A. TRANSNATIONAL CLAIMS UNDERMINE DEVELOPMENT B ECAUSE COUNTRIES
THAT ARE SOURCES OF TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION ARE LESS C OMPETITIVE

In a long term perspective, tran snational human rights litigation may have a
negative impact on development: Countries that are sources of transnational litigation
may become, overtime, less competitive than countries that afford domestic, legal redress
to human rights violations. 56
As many commentators suggest, this litigation is moving its early steps very often
with insurmountable difficulties. However, it is likely that courts will be increasingly
asked to adjudicate those kinds of claims in the next few years. As I argued earlier in the
paper, overtime Western courts will likely hold Western companies accountable for their
actions and omission in LDCs under the legal standards that they apply in domestic cases.
In other words, Western corporations will be held accountable to identical standards
whether investing in developed countries or in LDCs that are sources of transnational
claims. For instance, if the South African case had been tried rather than settled, the
English judges would have been asked to decide whether or not Cape was negligent in
exposing South African miners to an unreasonable risk. The lawyers would have
probably borrowed information – medical link between asbestos and several diseases,
knowledge of asbestos toxicity, availability of safer technologies – largely from the
earlier asbestos litigation in U.K. courts. Moreover, although contextualizing the
information gathered along the litigation process to South Africa, the U.K. judges would
have likely held the defendants liable for damages based on U.K. tort law rather than
South African negligence principles.
This suggestion logically leads to investigate its implications on the LDCs
involved. In my analysis, I assume that courts in a LDC, Country Z, ordinarily hear cases
that qualify as human rights violations, while courts in Country A do not afford similar
legal protection. Country Z is thus not a source of transnational litigation; Country A is.
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Country Z would thus have a legal and judicial system capable of holding domestic and
foreign violators of human rights accountable for their misconducts. Because both the
rule of law and a politically-independent judiciary are in place, Country Z’s system works
and its policymakers are in the position of being able to draft less rigorous standards than
Western democracies, in a fashion that will attract foreign investors without
compromising basic individual freedoms. 57 These countries could thus make use of their
legal systems as tools to attract foreign investors by adopting and implementing liability
standards more liberal than countries with similar level of development yet unable to
provide internal legal redress. In the other hand, LDCs that are sources of transnational
human rights litigation in the past or where the lack of rule of law and of an independent
judiciary strongly suggest that, in case of human rights violations, lawsuits will be filed in
the country where the parent company has its headquarters, are not in the position to
attract foreign investors, who will be likely to be held accountable in their home courts
based on more rigorous standards. Overtime, the latter countries would attract fewer
investments, thus undermining their economic development. In sum, countries with a
weaker rule of law and institutions and high risk of generating transnational lawsuits will
attract less investments that countries where a greater level of domestic redress is
afforded to citizens whose human rights have been violated. Western investors will in
fact be likely attracted to LDCs with lower – yet respectful of basic human rights –
standards of liability for workplace misconducts.
B. TRANSNATIONAL CLAIMS UNDERMINE DEVELOPMENT BY WEAKENING
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND JUDICIARIES

Transnational human rights litigation may weaken local institutions of the LDCs
whose citizen bring the claims in foreign courts. It may in fact reduce their ability to
regulate domestic matters and to negotiate matters of foreign policy with the governments
of the countries where the litigation takes place.
In transnational litigation, a foreign judge determines whether or not a violation of
a human right took place in the country where the negligent actions and omissions
occurred. To conclude that a violation took place, the foreign judge shall determine what
the defendants should have done to avoid violating a human right. Thus transnational
litigation turns into ‘an exercise in extraterritorial jurisdiction: courts in one jurisdiction
sit in judgment on the propriety and legality of behaviour in another jurisdiction.’ 58
The foreign judge may do so by making reference to various sources, namely the
‘laws of nations,’ to the legal standards of either countries involved, or to international
law and agreements. However, whichever legal basis the court adopts, the political
significance of its action does not change. Foreign judge are in essence making a
normative assessment of the other legal system. In their opinions, foreign judges are thus
stating what the law of the country where the violation took place should be. The
institutions of LDCs that are sources of transnational litigation are consequently limited
in their ability to regulate internal matters.
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Transnational litigation has also a second negative impact on the institutions of
LDCs that are sources of those claims. It weakens the role of LDC governments in
shaping foreign policy. The argument has been made from United States’ perspective, by
saying that ATCA litigation undermines U.S. foreign policy. A commentator argued that,
The use of the statute for human rights litigation, including these
corporate suits, inherently involves policy decisions that are better made
by the executive and legislative branches, not the judicial branch . . .
There’s a real danger that these lawsuits, if they continue to expand as
they have, could truly interfere with relations that we have with foreign
governments. 59

This is certainly an important issue. Over the years, several ATCA lawsuits have
brought to the defendant stand several foreign government officials. From a constitutional
point of view, the relationship between the United States and foreign governments is left
to, and better served, by Congress and the President rather than federal courts. If this
argument does not directly affect the interests of the main stakeholders of the process, i.e.
LDC citizens, the reverse does. By adjudicating on the liability of Western companies
and local governments, foreign courts step into foreign policy affairs, thus limiting the
role of local governments in the shaping their foreign policy. Governments of LDCs
generating ATCA claims are in fact not in a position of negotiating with foreign
governments’ trade agreements and other matter of foreign policy involving trade issues
because foreign judges eventually have the last word on the matters to be negotiated. 60
C. TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IS AN INADEQUATE CONFLICT
RESOLUTION PROCESS

The success of transnational claims has often been praised as a great victory for
the victims of the violations. It is irrefutable that this form of litigation often provides
with only avenue for redress available. Without access to foreign courts, many people
around the world would be deprived of a chance to have their claims heard, the damages
would not be compensated, and the violations not be prevented from happening again.
However, is transnational litigation the best dispute resolution process available for the
future? I am addressing this question by looking at how the capability approach addresses
this policy challenge. After showing that the capability approach points out that
transnational litigation is inadequate from a political standpoint, I now turn to
transnational claims as a specific dispute resolution process. Several factors suggest it is
an inadequate dispute resolution process in light of the capability approach’s quest for
expansion of people’s capabilities. 61 Key aspects of the adjudication process in foreign
courts support my argument that local policymakers and international organizations and
lawyers should direct their effort towards strengthening domestic dispute resolution
rather than relying on transnational litigation to redress human rights violations.
1. Participation
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Dispute resolution scholarship points out that participation of the victims in the
dispute resolution process should not be overlooked. Studies show that domestic litigants
in the United Kingdom and in the United States are overall dissatisfied with the litigation
process and that their judgments are based on their perception of the fairness of the
procedures used in reaching decisions.62 In fact, the empirical literature shows that the
opportunities to comprehend and actively take part in proceedings and whether they have
control over the procedure and the outcome influence the claimants’ perception of the
process. Under the capability approach, people shall have the capability to take part of the
process that adjudicates their rights and freedoms. Transnational litigation offers,
however, little possibility to meet those (procedural) needs. Both financial and practical
constraints prevent stakeholders from directly participating in the process. Moreover,
even if in the material conditions to attend the trial, claimants would be in the difficult
position of understanding a process that takes place in a different language and that is that
expression of different cultural, political and legal traditions. These reasons alone raise
concerns of adequacy of the process, and of procedural justice of transnational litigation.
Furthermore, the lead actors of the process are foreign lawyers, judge, and jurors,
interpreting the process with their own Western, cultural values.
2. Damages

American or English courts will soon be required to make a determination of
liability and, if liability is established, to award reasonable compensation to the victims.
As discussed above, such determination involves important issues of what standards of
liability foreign judges should apply. They will likely apply standards that are commonly
shared in the communities where they live and exercise their professions.63 Similarly,
once the court finds the defendants liable, it will assess compensation by awarding the
damages that are generally awarded in similar circumstances in the jurisdiction where the
trial takes places. Courts could not act differently. As a consequence, the liquidated
damages will be much higher than those that the claimants could recover by litigating the
same claims in their national court.
This conclusion creates practical and theoretical problems. From a practical
standpoint, this system provides incentives for forum shopping and race to Western
jurisdictions generating concerns of efficiency of the dispute resolution arrangement and
of allocation of resources. From a theoretical standpoint, the awards raise issues of
fairness with respect to the victims of the jurisdiction where the litigation takes place.
They would receive relatively smaller amounts if compared to their economic losses.
Assuming the harm inflicted is equal, LDC victims would in fact enjoy a greater
difference between the damages awarded and the extent of the economic loss suffered
than victims situated in similar positions and living in the jurisdiction where the litigation
takes places. 64
3. Enforcement
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Lastly, transnational litigation potential raises issues of enforcement of the
judgment. Enforcement is a process aimed at materializing the practical results of a
judgment. In the case of damage awards, the enforcement process aims at transferring the
amount of liquidated damages from the pockets of the liable defendant to the plaintiff. If
enforcement of a foreign judgment is sought, the general principle of international law
applicable in such cases is that a foreign state claims and exercises the right to examine
judgments for four causes: (1) to determine if the court had jurisdiction; (2) to determine
whether the defendant was properly served; (3) to determine if the proceedings were
vitiated by fraud; and (4) to establish that the judgment is not contrary to the public
policy of the foreign country. 65
Although enforcement has not been an issue in transnational cases so far because
all of them in earlier stages of the litigation process or have been settled, transnational
litigation raises issues of enforcement of the judgment. If the litigation were to take place
in the countries where the victims reside, the final judgment would be enforced locally.
However, the defendants’ largest assets are commonly in the United States or in the
United Kingdom, thus creating the need for a transnational enforcement. In this scenario,
the judgment would be deemed ‘foreign’ by U.S. and U.K. courts, thus triggering their
right to examine the judgments.
On the other, litigating claims in the jurisdiction where the defendant has the
majority of its assets certainly facilitates damage awards’ enforcement. The assets of the
liable defendant are easy to locate, and the judgment has power to be enforced without
further scrutiny. Nonetheless, this process may raise pressing issues. First, allocating the
money in the defendant’s pocket to foreign claimants may jeopardise the ability of
domestic victims of tortuous acts of recovering damages awarded in their favour. Thus,
compensating citizens of other countries for negligent actions an omissions that took
place outside the jurisdiction and depriving domestic victims creates a tension between
the social and the individual dimension of justice. In past few years, several large
American and British companies have filed for bankruptcies as a result of the large
number of personal injury lawsuits filed, mostly by domestic plaintiffs, against them. 66 If
transnational litigation targets ‘at risk of bankruptcy’ companies, damages awards in
favour of foreign victims – although technically ‘domestic’ - would raise issues of
fairness. In fact, if considered in its social dimension rather than the perspective of the
individuals actors involved, scholars have pointed out that the tort system allegedly
accomplishes goals of social justice. And those ends would be partially frustrated by
compensating foreign victims. Although not frequent, tensions between domestic and
foreign plaintiffs have already emerged in two U.S. bankruptcy proceedings. 67 The best
way to proceed should probably be found in favouring domestic resolution of controversy
and in improving the system of satisfaction of transnational creditors whose monetary
entitlements arise out of domestic judgments. Furthermore, LDC could request to secure
the potential liability following a finding of tort liability for violations of human rights to
foreign investors at the time of the initial investment. 68
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VI. CONCLUSION: STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW
Infringing basic human rights is despicable, and simply morally wrong. The
capability approach aims at giving people the necessary conditions of a life with human
dignity. The capability approach thus provides a powerful framework to impose a moral
duty to stop and redress those violations, and to prevent them from happening in the
future. Shaping mechanisms to translate the ethical commands into practical actions is a
problematic task. Legal redress seems to be, at least in Western commentators’ and
lawyers’ mind, the mechanism that best serves these moral ends.
In the last few years, individuals of countries that do not afford basic human rights
have increasingly sought redress by filing transnational human rights claims. Because of
the lack the rule of law and legal institutions that can reasonably provide redress to those
claims, individuals whose basic rights are compressed pursue their claims where such
preconditions exist. In the paper, I argued that, although transnational claims benefit LDC
victims in the present time – because their harms would otherwise not be redressed –
overtime they create unintended consequences in terms of weakening the economic and
institutional development process of LDC and by providing an inadequate dispute
resolution process.
Transnational litigation should thus not be seen as the optimal mechanism of
redress of human rights violations in LDC in the future. By contrary, local redress would
better serve the moral goals that the capabilities approach proposes. Building stronger
local institutions and judiciaries and a stronger rule of law in LDC is thus not only the
best policy solution but is also a moral obligation of the parties involved in the process
whether from the North or the South. In this regards, both stakeholders – local and
international NGOs and foreign investors – and international organization – the UN and
the World Bank above all69 – should be fully engaged in investing in institution and
capability building in order to create the precondition for local redress of basic human
rights violations, a redress able to stop and prevent those violations from happening
again.70
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